Feeback v. Swift Pork Co. – Providing parity in Iowa employment law

Mariah L. Sukalski | Alexandra M. Cutler

October 16, 2023 | Labor and Employment

In 2009, the Iowa Supreme Court adopted the motivating-factor standard for discrimination claims under the Iowa Civil Rights Act (“ICRA”) in Deboom v. Raining Rose, Inc., 772 N.W.2d 1, 12-14 (Iowa 2009), and later abandoned the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework when instructing the jury on discrimination claims in Hawkins v. Grinnell Regional Medical Center, 929 N.W.2d 261, 272 (Iowa 2019). Since 2019, an open question remained regarding what standard of proof to use at summary judgment for discrimination claims relying on indirect evidence under the ICRA. On March 31, in Feeback v. Swift Pork Company, the Iowa Supreme Court resolved that question by modifying the summary judgment framework to align with the jury instructions used at trial (988 N.W.2d 340, 347 (Iowa 2023)).

Understanding Iowa’s approach requires a brief review of Title VII standards. The Supreme Court of the United States established the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework for employment discrimination cases brought under Title VII (McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–05 (1973)). Under the burden-shifting approach, “the employee must show a prima facie case of discrimination,” and “[t]he burden then shifts to the employer to show a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employer’s action” (Hawkins, 929 N.W.2d at 268 (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802–04)).“If the employer shows a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action, the burden shifts back to the employee to show the reason for the employer’s action was pretextual” (Id).

The Supreme Court subsequently adopted the same-decision framework for “mixed-motive” cases in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989) (plurality opinion), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107(a), 105 Stat. 1071, 1075 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(m) (2012). Under the mixed-motives approach, if the “plaintiff proves that a discriminatory factor played a motivating part in the employer’s decision (i.e., there were mixed motives), the employer may avoid liability by presenting evidence that it would have made the same decision in the absence of the discriminatory motive” (Hawkins, 929 N.W.2d at 268 (citing Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 258)). Congress subsequently codified the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which modified the Court’s Price Waterhouse decision and created the same decision defense in all Title VII cases. This returned federal law to the McDonnell Douglas standard.  

In 2019, the Iowa Supreme Court decided Hawkins (929 N.W.2d at 264). In Hawkins, the court recognized that the ICRA does not fully align with Title VII and took “the first step and adopted the motivating-factor standard” under the ICRA, which requires a plaintiff to demonstrate discrimination was a motivating factor of the employer’s decision to terminate their employment (929 N.W.2d at 270, 272 (citing DeBoom, 772 N.W.2d at 12–13)). Accordingly, the court abandoned the use of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework at trial on ICRA discrimination and retaliation claims (929 N.W.2d at 272).  Instead, the court “directed [] state trial courts to apply the Price Waterhouse motivating factor causation test when instructing the jury,” (Feeback (988 N.W.2d at 347)), and adopted the same-decision affirmative defense (Hawkins, 929 N.W.2d at 272). The court did not address the appropriate standard for summary judgment, leaving an open-ended question under Iowa law.

The Iowa Supreme Court avoided deciding the summary judgment standard for discrimination claims under the ICRA in Hedlund v. State (930 N.W.2d 707, 723 (Iowa 2019)). In Hedlund, the court recognized the open question existed: If the standard of proof at trial had changed, what is the standard of proof at summary judgment for discrimination claims relying on indirect evidence under the ICRA? (Id. at 720). In short, should the McDonnell Douglas framework be abandoned at summary judgment, too? 

Sidestepping the question, the court determined it did “not need to decide this issue” because under either approach, “Hedlund has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact” for his age discrimination claims (Id. at 719). The court analyzed the facts surrounding Hedlund’s termination within and outside of the McDonnell Douglas framework (Id. at 723). The court included a footnote referencing their decision in Hawkins and stating it did “not disturb [Iowa’s] prior law as it applies to summary judgment” (Id. at 719 n.8). As such, the use of the McDonnell Douglas standard at the summary judgment stage continued.

The partial concurrence and partial dissent in Hedlund argued the McDonnell Douglas framework was not the proper test under Iowa law (See Id. at 727 (Appel, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). Even though the court stated it did not change Iowa’s previous case law relying on the McDonnell Douglas framework at summary judgment, Hedlund left ample room for subsequent arguments against the continued use of the McDonnell Douglas framework.  

On March 31, the Iowa Supreme Court decided Feeback v. Swift Pork Company (988 N.W.2d 340 (Iowa 2023)). Like Hedlund, Feeback involved an appeal of an age discrimination claim under the ICRA dismissed at summary judgment (Feeback, 988 N.W.2d at 343–44). The district court dismissed the case using the McDonnell Douglas framework (Feeback v. Swift Pork Co., No. LACI009957, 2020 WL 7296619, *4 (Iowa Dist. Ct. Oct. 12, 2020)). 

On appeal, the parties disagreed regarding the standard that should be applied. As multiple parties had done since the confusion left in the wake of Hawkins and Hedlund, the plaintiff argued that the McDonnell Douglas standard should not apply; the defendant argued it still controlled (Feeback, 988 N.W.2d at 346). The Iowa Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment after performing analyses under both McDonnell Douglas and the motivating factor standards (Feeback v. Swift Pork Co., No. 20-1467, 2022 WL 951097, at *3-6 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 30, 2022)). On further review, the Iowa Supreme Court officially modified “the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework for summary judgment on discrimination claims under the Iowa Civil Rights Act [] to align with the causation standard at trial” (Feeback, 988 N.W.2d at 344). The decision provided clarity and continuity.

The court’s decision in Feeback directs parties to utilize the following standard for discrimination claims relying on indirect evidence under the ICRA:

Under our modified McDonnell Douglas test, employees “must carry the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of age discrimination.” Employees do so by showing that they are members of a protected group (i.e., age 60), were qualified for their positions, and the circumstances of their discharge raised an inference of discrimination. Then, the employer must “‘articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason’ for its employment action.” At that point, the burden shifts back to the employee to demonstrate the employer’s proffered reason is pretextual or, while true, was not the only reason for [their] termination and that [their] age was another motivating factor (Id. at 347–48).

The court modified the burden-shifting framework for summary judgment “to align the summary judgment test with the mixed-motive causation standard and the same-decision defense at trial”  (Id. at 347). The court ultimately concluded “Feeback failed to generate a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment on his age discrimination claim” under their new standard (Id. at 346).

Additionally, the Iowa Supreme Court formally adopted the “honest belief rule,” relying on precedent from the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit (Id. at 344). Under the "honest belief rule", the “critical inquiry in discrimination cases like this one is not whether the employee actually engaged in the conduct for which [they were] terminated, but whether the employer in good faith believed that the employee was guilty of the conduct justifying discharge”  (Id. at 349 (quoting Pulczinski v. Trinity Structural Towers, Inc., 691 F.3d 996, 1002, 8th Cir. 2012)).  Thus, for an employee to survive summary judgment on discrimination claims under the ICRA, the employee “must show that [their] employer did not honestly believe the legitimate reason it proffered in support of the adverse action” (Id. at 350 (quoting Pulczinski, 691 F.3d at 1002)). The court ultimately concluded that Feeback “made no such showing” (Id).

Feeback provides much-needed clarity, uniformity, and parity on the standard applicable through all stages of litigation under the ICRA. The court’s opinion ends the debate of whether the McDonnell Douglas standard applies, and ensures the parties face the same standards at summary judgment as they do at trial. Further, even though the court’s opinion in Feeback does not expressly address all arguments raised in Justice Appel’s concurrence in part and dissent in part in Hedlund, the modified standard allows for the possibility of multiple reasons for a challenged decision and is consistent with other tort law where plaintiffs are “unable to untangle the threads of multiple causation” (Hedlund, 930 N.W.2d at 727).

The motivating-factor standard incorporated into the Iowa Supreme Court’s modified standard provides a potentially lower burden of proof for the employee to survive summary judgment but largely maintains the existing standard (See Hawkins, 292 N.W.2d at 271). Although the court affirmed summary judgment in favor of the employer in Feeback, the modified standard provides employees two paths to trial. The employee can either demonstrate the employer’s proffered reason is pretextual or, even if true, the employer also had a discriminatory motive. 

The court’s adoption of the honest belief rule, however, adds a barrier if a plaintiff is faced with an employer presenting a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for termination. Absent evidence the employer did not honestly believe it’s given reason, an employee like Feeback will not survive summary judgment (Feeback, 988 N.W.2d at 349–50). Therefore, although a mixed motive is sufficient, a plaintiff still must present evidence of discriminatory motive (Id).  Further, even where a mixed motive exists, the employer can present a same-decision defense. While Iowa adopted the same-decision defense before modifying its summary judgment standard, the adoption of the same-decision standard is based primarily on fairness (Hawkins, 929 N.W.2d at 271-272). Thus, “when an employee proves discrimination was a motivating factor in the employer’s actions, the employer could avoid liability by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the same decision even if it had not taken the plaintiff’s gender [or other protected characteristics] into account” (Feeback, 988 N.W.2d at 347 (quoting Hawkins, 828 N.W.2d at 272)). 

It remains to be seen whether the decision will ultimately benefit employees or employers. The court’s decision to bring uniformity to the burden of proof for discrimination claims under the ICRA will bring much-needed stability to Iowa’s employment law. As the court recognized in Haskenhoff v. Homeland Energy Solutions, LLC:

Predictability and stability are especially important in employment law. Employers must comply with both state and federal law. Human resources personnel and supervisors must apply myriad rules and regulations in complex situations. Employers and prospective employers should be able to rely on our precedents. We would generate significant uncertainty if we overrule our own long-standing precedent to diverge from settled federal interpretations. Uncertainty invites more litigation and increasing costs for all parties. An uncertain or costly litigation environment inhibits job creation (897 N.W.2d 553, 585 (Iowa 2017)).

Overall, the Iowa Supreme Court brought uniformity in Feeback by ensuring the parties have the same standard of proof at summary judgment as they do at trial using the mixed-motive causation standard and same-decision affirmative defense.

Originally published in the The Iowa Lawyer (October 2023).